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The epistemological role of empathy in
psychopathological diagnosis: a contemporary
reassessment of Karl Jaspers’ account
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Abstract
Introduction: In his classic essay “The phenomenological approach to psychopathology”, Karl Jaspers defended the
irreducible reality of the “subjective” mental symptoms and stressed the pivotal role of empathy in their diagnostic
assessment. However, Jaspers’ account of the epistemological role of empathy in psychopathological diagnosis was
far from clear: whereas at several places Jaspers claimed that empathy provides a direct access to patients’
abnormal mental experiences, at other places he stressed that it did so only indirectly, through a whole battery of
their observable clinical indicators. The aim of this paper is to reassess Jaspers’ account of the epistemological role
of empathy in psychopathological diagnosis.
Methods: I examine thoroughly Jaspers’ assertions on in the role of empathy in the diagnosis of “subjective”
symptoms. Moreover, I explicate briefly the epistemological status of psychopathological diagnostic examination
with the aid of the distinction between direct and indirect observation.
Results: Diagnostic assessment of “subjective” mental symptoms involves necessarily indirect psychopathological
observation. Jaspers’ ambiguity is traced to his failure to distinguish clearly between direct and indirect
psychopathological observation along with his excessive reliance on empathy. Relatedly, Jaspers’ ambiguity is also
traced to his conflation of the semantics with the epistemology of psychopathological concepts representing
patients’“ subjective” mental symptoms. These results apply also to contemporary phenomenological approaches to
psychopathological diagnostic examination which maintain that patients’ abnormal mental experiences are
invariably expressed in their overt behavior.
Conclusions: Jaspers was right in stressing that psychopathological concepts of subjective mental symptoms
represent patients’ genuine abnormal experiences irreducible to concepts representing their associated behavioral
manifestations. Moreover, he was right in stressing the importance of the empathic ‘second person’ approach to
patients’ mental experiences. However, he failed to recognize unambiguously that the epistemological access to
patients’ mental symptoms, though enormously aided by empathy, remains mainly indirect and thus requires also a
‘third person’ approach to them. Overall then, clinical psychopathological examination requires both a ‘second’ and
a ‘third’ person approach, as well as their judicious alternation during the diagnostic interview. Although focused
on Jaspers’ essay, my critical analysis is also highly relevant to contemporary psychopathological approaches aiming
to overcome the serious limitations of currently prevailing systems of diagnostic criteria of mental disorders.
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Jaspers’ essay of 1912 “The phenomenological approach
in psychopathology” is justly considered as a classic
in clinical psychiatry [1,2]. Its lasting impact lies in
Jaspers’ insistence that the accurate description of
patients’ actual abnormal mental experiences involves
a special method, namely the method of empathy
(‘Einfühlung’).
The aim of this paper is to scrutinize critically Jaspers’
account of the epistemological role of empathy in
psychopathological diagnostic investigation. This issue
has been insufficiently clarified in a recent extensive
and otherwise illuminating commentary on Jaspers’ essay
([3], pp 181–191). Owing to my exclusive focus on the
epistemological status of empathy in clinical psycho-
pathological diagnosis, I will leave completely aside
here the issue of the undeniably crucial role of em-
pathy in the context of psychotherapies. In particular,
I will not address the issue of whether the adoption
of a “phenomenological stance” can give rise to a dis-
tinctive kind of empathy (“radical empathy”) enabling
the understanding of abnormal mental experiences in
patients with severe mental disorders [4]. Phenome-
nological approaches stress the paramount import-
ance of our embodied and contextualized interactions
with others for understanding their mental states. Re-
latedly, they claim that most if not all mental experi-
ences are expressed in behavior and thus are directly
understood (e.g. [5]). The evaluation of these approaches
lies well beyond the scope of the present work. How-
ever, I will deal briefly with the latter claim known as
the ‘direct perception’ thesis of another’s mental states
and argue that even if it were true in general, it would
still not provide a fully adequate account of clinicians’
reasoning in the context of psychopathological diagnos-
tic examination. The plan of the paper is the following:
I first discuss Jaspers’ bipartition of mental symptoms
in ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’. Then, I examine thor-
oughly Jaspers’ assertions on the exact epistemological
role of empathy as the special method for the investiga-
tion of ‘subjective’ mental symptoms, and find them
ambiguous. Furthermore, I elucidate the epistemological
status of psychopathological examination as a pre-
requisite for the investigation of the exact role of em-
pathy therein. I argue that psychopathological diagnostic
examination involves mainly indirect scientific obser-
vation and that empathy, though important therein, has
a mainly heuristic, not probative, value. Moreover, I
propose an explanation of Jaspers’ a m b i g u i t ya n dar e -
interpretation of his essay which restores its clarity. Fi-
nally, I explain why contemporary phenomenological
approaches cannot provide a fully adequate account of
the epistemological status of psychopathological diagnostic
examination.
Psychopathological diagnosis, mental symptoms
and empathy
Jaspers partitions the set of mental symptoms into two
major classes: the class of ‘objective’ and the class of
‘subjective’ symptoms. Moreover, he partitions further
the ‘objective’ symptoms in three categories. The first
subsumes those which are accessible to our unaided
visual perception: patients’ spontaneous movements, ap-
pearance, observable actions etc. Furthermore, the sec-
ond category subsumes those elicited by specific clinical
tests, e.g. of intelligence or memory, and the third those
which can be detected in the rational content of patients’
spontaneous verbal reports such as e. g. bizarre delusions.
‘Objective’ symptoms share in common that they can
be detected through sensory perception and rational
thought only, without any empathic involvement of the
diagnostician. Several of Jaspers’‘ objective symptoms’
are what nowadays are called clinical ‘signs’, i.e., clinical
features of mental disorder directly observable or, if
only indirectly observable, elicited through the applica-
tion of appropriate standardized techniques without any
recourse to patients’ subjective complaints and confi-
dences. Those which can be identified by direct clinical
observation can be described accurately with the aid
of clinical observational concepts, e.g. psychomotor
retardation, stupor, psychomotor excitement or psycho-
motor agitation. However, several of his other ‘objective
symptoms’ require for their diagnostic detection indirect
observation. For example, the administration of neuro-
psychological tests for the diagnostic detection of memory
disturbances is an instance of indirect observation, since
the accuracy of their findings depends essentially on the re-
liability and validity of these tests.
By contrast, “subjective” mental symptoms cannot
be accessed in this manner, but only through em-
pathy. Empathy, empathic understanding or empathic
actualization (‘Vergegenwärtigung’)o fp a t i e n t s ’ mental
experiences by clinical psychopathologists during the
diagnostic interview is the proper method of investigation
of subjective or properly mental symptoms. ‘Subjective
symptoms cannot be perceived by the sense-organs but
have to be grasped by transferring oneself, so to say, into
the other individual’s psyche, that is, by empathy. They can
only become an inner reality for the observer by his partici-
pating in the other person’s experiences (‘through co-
experience/Miterleben’ in the original, Jaspers’ italics), not
by any intellectual effort (Denken)’ ([1], p. 314, [2], p. 2).
The method of empathy aims at the understanding of
patients’ mental experiences. Jaspers distinguishes be-
tween the static and the genetic understanding of pa-
tients’ mental experiences. Static understanding consists
in the empathy-driven re-experience of patients’ actual
mental experiences during the diagnostic interview, with-
out any human prejudices or pre-conceived theoretical
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to the accurate observation, description and diagnostic
identification of abnormal mental experiences. By con-
trast, genetic understanding consists in the empathy-
driven detection of the meaningful connections between
patients’ abnormal mental experiences in their temporal
unfolding, including the psychological impact of adverse
life-events or processes on their current mental state and
behavior.
Jaspers on the epistemological role of empathy in
psychopathological diagnosis
At several places of his essay, Jaspers claimed that clini-
cians’ empathic access to the various types of patients’
mental experiences is a direct process. Jaspers conceived
of this process as analogous to the process of direct
observation in the natural sciences and its presumed
maximal accuracy, likening it to the process of vision,
however with an ‘inner eye’: ‘We can grasp (subjective
symptoms such as emotions and inner processes) imme-
diately from their physical concomitants; these we take
thus to “express” the underlying emotion’.( …) ‘For the
actualization to ourselves of all these phenomenologic-
ally ultimate characteristics, we have such expressions as
“seeing”, “viewing” (…) and so on. These expressions al-
ways denote the kind of ultimate concept-fitting experi-
ence which plays the same role in psychology as sensory
perception plays in the natural sciences. Just as sense-
perceptions are evoked by the demonstration of an
object, so this meaningful empathic actualization will be
evoked in us by (…) our immediate grasp of expressive
phenomena and our self-immersion in other people’ss e l f -
description’ ([1], p. 319, [2], p. 4). ‘Phenomenology (…)
views psychic events “as from within”, and brings them
into immediate realization’ ([1], p. 326, [2], p. 8), ‘Only
where something can be reduced to “reality” and becomes
an immediate datum, i.e. becomes concrete, can it form
the subject for phenomenology’ ([1], p. 323, [2], p. 7).
Psychopathologists ‘acquire an unprejudiced direct
grasp of these events as they really are’ ([1], p. 318,
[2], p. 4). ‘Phenomenology deals only with the immedi-
ately given’ ([1], p. 323, [2], p. 6, slightly modified English
translation). Moreover, in teaching psychopathology, the
specialist ‘must make sure that’ (his students) ‘do not
simply think along him, but they see along him in contact
and conversation with patients and through their own
observations. This “seeing” is not done with the senses,
but through the understanding’ ([1], p. 318, [2], p. 4).
On the other hand, at other places of his essay, Jaspers
stressed that empathy does not provide such an immedi-
ate access to patients’ mental experiences. Instead, clini-
cians should also have recourse to a variety of indirect
methods such as ‘exploration by direct questioning of
the patients and by means of accounts they themselves,
under our guidance, give of their own experiences’ or
patients’‘ written self-descriptions’ ([1], p. 320, [2], p. 5).
More precisely, ‘they are all those psychic experiences
and phenomena which patients describe to us and which
only become accessible to us at secondhand (‘mittelbar’/
indirectly in the original with Jaspers’ italics) through
the patient’s own judgment and presentation’ ([1], p. 314,
[2], p. 2, Jaspers’ italics). Moreover,‘subjective symptoms
also include those mental processes which we have to
infer (and ‘interpret/deuten’ with italics in the original,
omitted in the English translation), from fragments of
the two previous kinds of data, manifested by patient’s
actions and the way he (sic) conducts his life’ ([1], p. 314,
[2], p. 2). ‘We have to be led, starting from the outside
(italics in the original), to a real appreciation of a particular
psychic phenomenon by looking at its genesis, the condi-
tions of its appearance, its configurations, its context and
possible concrete contents, also by making use of intuitive
comparison and symbolization, by directing our observa-
tions in whatever ways may suggest themselves (…). The
more numerous and specific these indirect hints become,
the more well-defined and characteristic do the phenom-
ena studied appear’ ([1], p. 318, [2], p. 4). Finally, even my
quotation of Jaspers on the teaching of psychopathology is
preceded by an analogy of psychopathological observation
with histological observation, a standard example of indir-
ect scientific observation through microscope. ‘A histologist
will provide an exhaustive description of particular mor-
phological elements, but he will do it in such a way as to
make it easier for others to see these elements for them-
selves, and he has to presume, or else induce, this “seeing
for oneself” in those who really want to understand him”
([1], p. 318, [2], p. 4).
In his opus magnum “General psychopathology” pub-
lished the following year and regularly revised and ex-
panded for almost 30 years, Jaspers dealt with the same
issue in only two pages, referring the reader for a more
detailed analysis to his essay of 1912 ([6], pp. 47–48).
Therein, Jaspers stressed more clearly the mainly indir-
ect mode of access to patients’ abnormal mental experi-
ences through a whole battery of ‘external features’ ([6],
p. 47). However, he persisted in claiming that psychopa-
thologists should strive for ‘the unprejudiced direct grasp
of the mental as it is’ ([6], p. 48, emphasis added).
Overall then, the elucidation by Jaspers of the epis-
temological role of empathy or static understanding in
clinical psychopathological examination and diagnosis is
far from clear. Granted that psychopathological concepts
of mental symptoms represent real kinds of patients’
abnormal mental experiences and not their possible
behavioral manifestations, it remains unclear whether
empathy provides a direct or indirect mode of access to
them. Of note, as a psychological process, this access
might obtain quasi-automatically or rapidly and as such
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ing and experience. To the extent that Jaspers admits
the necessity of psychopathologists’ recourse to these
“numerous indirect hints”, he admits that empathic ac-
cess is indirect, which however is in tension with his nu-
merous claims to the contrary quoted above.
Thus, the complex epistemological operation of psy-
chopathological diagnostic examination deserves further
scrutiny in order to better appreciate the place and role
of empathy within it. Accordingly, in the following sec-
tion, I provide a brief characterization of psychopatho-
logical diagnostic examination, following the standard in
contemporary philosophy of science distinction between
direct and indirect scientific or, for that matter, clinical
diagnostic observation [7]. Direct scientific observation
bears on features accessible to unaided perception. By
contrast, indirect scientific observation bears on features
which are not so accessible, but are inferred with the
help of hypotheses linking them to features accessible to
unaided perception. The latter are then called indicators
of the former and the hypotheses in question indicator-
hypotheses. Although direct observation is usually less
effortful than indirect observation, this is far from invari-
ant: expert feature detection through indirect observa-
tion can become after long training almost “automatic”
or effortless, whereas direct observation can at times re-
quire great effort.
On the epistemological status of psychopathological
diagnostic examination
The overwhelming majority of mental symptoms cannot
be directly observed and “actualized” in clinicians’ con-
sciousness, even if their presence may be evoked or sug-
gested by the direct observation of patients’ appearance
and behavior. This is as it should be, since all proper
mental functions such as thought, emotion, memory, at-
tention, perception, volition and motivation, along with
their psychopathological disturbances, are not directly
observable. Typically, mental symptoms are inferred
during the diagnostic interview from patients’ spon-
taneous and elicited verbal descriptions of their mental
experiences. Even spontaneously expressed mental symp-
toms in patients’ verbal self-descriptions need to be
scrutinized through elucidatory questions before being
diagnosed as such. This is so since a whole battery of
generic conditions needs to be satisfied in order to ensure
the reliability of patients’ self-descriptions, that is, their
accurate reflection of patients’ underlying abnormal
mental experiences. The most conspicuous of these
conditions are the following: First, the patient is will-
ing to cooperate and verbally reports sincerely her
mental experiences (C1). Second, she is able to under-
stand clinicians’ eliciting questions to this effect (C2).
Third, she is able to identify, recall and report verbally
her mental experiences with reasonable accuracy. This
point has been raised by Langenbach as a limitation of
Jaspers’‘ phenomenology’ owing to the “dependency on
patients’ abilities to describe exactly and to communicate
their mental experiences” ([8], p. 217). Conversely, clini-
cians must disambiguate patients’ verbal reports on both
their present and past mental experiences (C3). Fourth,
the conditions under which the clinical interview takes
place should help the patient to overcome her psycho-
logical inhibitions or reticence to talk about intimate and
confidential personal matters (C4). Fifth, her answers are
not obtained through suggestion by clinicians (C5).
Moreover, the very wording of the specific questions
asked during the diagnostic interview is often crucial for
the detection of mental symptoms. For example, it has
been found that almost one third of patients with verbal
auditory hallucinations expect bystanders to hear them
also. Accordingly, the question pertaining to their diag-
nosis in the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV
[9] ‘do you hear things that other people do not hear?’ is
clearly misleading, and needs re-phrasing as ‘do you hear
things that other people around do not seem to hear, al-
though perhaps you expect them to hear or even believe
that they do?’ [10]. Last but not least, psychopathological
diagnostic examination presupposes the mastering of a
host of generalizations of two types: First, definitions of
the concepts of mental symptoms ‘patient x experiences
symptom S, if and only if, x experiences jointly features
F1, F2…,Fn’, and, second, diagnostic hypotheses linking
the indicators manifest in patients’ verbal reports to
their underlying mental symptoms ‘if patient x reports
verbal material indicative of experiential features F1,
F2,…,Fn, jointly characteristic of mental symptom S,
and conditions C1-C5 obtain, then x has mental symptom
S’. Generalizations of the second type sound as crypto-
tautologies but they are not, since the meanings of the
concepts ‘reporting’ and ‘experiencing’ are clearly differ-
ent: the former represents a behavioral process or activ-
ity whereas the latter a mental one. Moreover, only to
the extent that conditions C1-C5 obtain are diagnostic
inferences of this type logically valid.
Overall then, the pattern of psychopathological diag-
nostic examination in routine clinical practice is the
following: From patients’ verbal reports of some features of
their mental experiences and their empathic actualization
in our consciousness, along with the mastering of basic
psychopathological concepts and the reasonable satisfac-
tion of conditions C1-C5, we infer tentatively that they are
features of some known kind of mental symptom. For ex-
ample, if the patient reports recurrent and persistent
thoughts, impulses or images and conditions C1-C5 obtain,
we conjecture that the latter are experiential features of ob-
sessions. Next, we deduce that if they are features of that
kind of mental symptom, they should also possess the
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example, we deduce that they should be invariably experi-
enced as intrusive, inappropriate, anxiety-generating and
impossible to ignore or suppress, despite being recognized
as generated by one’s own mind. Then we investigate fur-
ther these mental experiential features as well as their
consistency and stability in search of additional relevant
evidence in order to test our psychopathological diagnostic
hypothesis. Furthermore, the elicitation of patients’ mental
symptoms, along with the mastering of criteria or guide-
lines for the diagnosis of mental disorders, gives rise to al-
ternative diagnostic hypotheses which are in turn tested
following the same methodological pattern.
Psychopathological diagnostic examination and the exact
place of empathy
To be sure, patients’‘ expressive phenomena’, i.e. their
prevalent ongoing emotional experiences in the course
of the clinical interview, can indeed be immediately
‘grasped from their physical concomitants’, such as facial
expressions, tone of voice, eye-contact, spontaneous
movements etc., by direct observation. However, emo-
tions in general and their mental experience as feelings
cannot be reduced to their associated observable behav-
ioral, especially facial, manifestations which are only
their clinical indicators. Indeed, emotions are global
bodily changes and feelings their subjective experience
in one’s consciousness [11]. Moreover, even this type of
empathy, does not guarantee invariably the accuracy of
our spontaneous ‘empathic actualizations’ and the result-
ing diagnostic judgments, as attested e.g. by clinical
cases of persuasive simulators. This holds a fortiori for
our investigation of patients’ abnormal mental experi-
ences, possibly without any manifest ‘concomitants’, such
as self-disturbances, beliefs, intentions, memories, im-
pulses, or perceptions. This is indeed the case for most
properly mental symptoms, e.g. passivity experiences,
phobias, obsessions, delusions or hallucinations, as well
as all for the totality of patients’ past abnormal mental
experiences including their emotional experiences, all
the more so since memory biases are pervasive. Here, we
must indeed have recourse to Jaspers’ numerous ‘indirect
hints’, along with a perfect mastering of psychopatho-
logical concepts, in order to form diagnostic hypotheses
and then check them for accuracy against new clinical ma-
terial. Moreover, the epistemological access this second
type of diagnostic reasoning gives us to patients’ mental
experiences is far from direct: assessing meticulously the
reliability of patients’ verbal reports (conditions C1-C5
above) and identifying accurately the symptomatic con-
stellations of their underlying experiential features is typic-
ally an inferentially highly complicated indirect process.
Likewise, our diagnostic judgments are fallible and need to
be further checked for accuracy.
What might be accessed directly are not patients’
mental symptoms as experienced by them, but as tenta-
tively re-experienced by us. Conflating our mental repre-
sentations of patients’ experiences with their actual
experiences amounts to the conflation of our representa-
tions with the items represented. To be sure, Jaspers did
not commit this fallacy, but several passages of his essay
quoted above might be misinterpreted along these lines.
Of note, the thesis of a direct and transparent epistemo-
logical access to one’s own mental states has been ser-
iously challenged by psychological research (see e.g. [12]).
Even granting the validity of this thesis, it remains still
that clinicians’ immediately accessed self-representations
of their patients’ experiences are always the products of
an indirect and fallible process of imaginative reconstruc-
tion of patients’ unobservable experiences from their ver-
bal and non-verbal behavior, along with the mastering of
clinical psychopathological concepts. The experience of
this process by expert clinicians as quasi-spontaneous
implies neither its epistemological directness nor the ac-
curacy of the resulting diagnostic judgments. Besides, in
diagnostically complicated or atypical cases, even expert
clinicians experience this process as reflective, laborious
and inferentially indirect. The same holds also for the
clinical investigation of novel abnormal kinds of mental
experiences for which no descriptive psychopathological
concepts are as yet available.
What distinguishes psychopathological clinical exam-
ination from other types of indirect scientific observa-
tion is the additional aid provided by our familiarity
with other peoples’ mental life from our own personal
mental life and our past interpersonal experiences, as well
as our capacity to form vivid and comprehensive represen-
tations of the various kinds of mental symptoms. It is here
I think that phenomenological approaches stressing the
importance of our interactions with others in specific con-
texts for their empathic understanding are indeed clearly
indispensable though insufficient as I will point out in the
next section, at least in the context of psychopathological
diagnostic examination. Moreover, the arts and the hu-
manities, especially literature, can help refine our ability to
imaginatively represent other peoples’ mental experiences
from their own perspectives, all the more so since the
range of our personal mental experiences is necessarily
limited. Prominent phenomenological thinker Alfred
Schutz has stressed that our understanding of the inter-
subjective social world is mediated by our pre-reflective
categorization of other people’s actions, motives, rela-
tions, or social roles, etc., in specific social life-situations
(called by him, following Husserl, “typifications”, see e.g.
[13]). More importantly, Schwartz and Wiggins have
also stressed the ubiquity of typifications in the context
of psychopathological diagnosis, acquired and refined by
long clinical training and extensive personal experience
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experience that we acquire and refine these typifications
involved in the diagnostic identification of the various
kinds of mental symptoms and mental disorders. How-
ever, they have rightly warned that, contrary to the unre-
flective or “naïve” typifications in ordinary life, our
psychopathological diagnostic typifications should be al-
ways subjected to critical scrutiny and tested for accuracy
by clinical evidence [14]. Thus, all these additional aids
facilitate our efforts to represent to ourselves patients’
mental experiences, investigate their connections to pa-
tients’ personality and life-conditions and assess the
severity of their impact on patients’ personal, inter-
personal and social life, however without rendering our
access to them direct. More accurate representations of
patients’ abnormal mental experiences might also require
the formation of more refined clinical psychopathological
concepts than those figuring in the diagnostic criteria of
DSM [15]) (see e.g. [16,17]). This might well be the case
in the field of depressive disorders whereby the delinea-
tion of distinct varieties of depressed mood now con-
flated in the DSM would facilitate both their clinical and
biological investigation and help improve their diagnostic
validity. Incidentally, the necessary investigation of the
connections between patients’ presumably abnormal
mental experiences and their overall life-conditions and
personality calls into question Jaspers’ sharp distinction
between static and genetic understanding. Furthermore,
empathy, though eminently helpful in the framing of
diagnostic hypotheses is clearly insufficient for their val-
idation during the clinical interview. In other words,
empathy has a mainly heuristic, not a probative value.
However, this undeniable heuristic advantage comes at a
price: we tend to project upon others our own social ste-
reotypes and prejudices, running thus the risk to form
biased or distorted ‘actualizations’ of their mental experi-
ences. Although Jaspers did not claim that empathy has a
probative value, again his ambiguity on its epistemo-
logical role might be misinterpreted along these lines, all
the more so since he also claimed that the accessibility of
patients’ mental experiences to clinicians’ empathic static
understanding warrants their categorization in three clas-
ses: fully understandable (strongly similar to our own
mental experiences), only partly understandable (similar
in kind though markedly dissimilar in intensity or clarity
to our own mental experiences) and, finally, completely
un-understandable or qualitatively dissimilar to normal
mental experiences (e.g. experiences of passivity and ex-
ternal control in schizophrenia) ([1], p. 321, [2], p. 5). Re-
latedly, German Berrios has criticized Jaspers for his
“exaggerated reliance on the powers of the observer
and on the use of his/her cognitive and social context to
decide on whether or not a given mental state is ‘compre-
hensible’” ([18], p. 319). Besides, the serious shortcomings
of our intuitive understanding of our fellow humans are
now well attested (see e.g. [19]). So far, empirical research
shows that humans display, in their ordinary encounters
with other people, rather low levels of empathic under-
standing, ranging from 25% to 35% [20].
A proposed “diagnosis” and “treatment” of Jaspers’
ambiguity
I submit that the logical contrariety or, at least, the am-
biguity in Jaspers’ essay stems from two main sources.
The first is his lack of any clear distinction between dir-
ect and indirect observation. This distinction would hold
even if it were construed as a mere difference of degree
along a continuum, not of kind. Indeed, proper mental
experiences, by their very nature, would be placed far
closer to the pole of the indirectly observables than to
the pole of the directly observables. Despite his nominal
use of the terms ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’, I presume that
Jaspers thought that all observation is eventually direct
observation. This is strongly suggested by his misleading
analogy between our sense-perception of the outer phys-
ical world and our empathic understanding of the inner
mental world. Accordingly, Jaspers was tempted to con-
strue psychopathological examination of mental symp-
toms as a novel kind of direct observation, however ‘with
an inner eye’. Jaspers’ misunderstanding of histological
observation as an example of direct (visual) observation
reinforces my presumption. However, his motivation was
perfectly sound: mental experiences and symptoms are
not identical to their possible overt manifestations in
patients’ behavior. Accordingly, the psychopathological
concepts intended to represent these mental experiences
and symptoms differ from the concepts representing
their possible overt manifestations. This is a difference in
their meaning, i.e. their sense and reference. Their refer-
ence is what they intend to represent (their referent) and
their sense a description of its main features. However,
this difference is independent from the mode of our epis-
temological access to their referents. In particular, the
(direct) reference of the concepts of properly mental
symptoms (‘subjective’ symptoms in the terminology of
Jaspers) to patients’ inner experiences does not entail that
our access to them is inferentially direct. For example,
the concept of obsession represents directly a recurrent
type of patients’ mental experiences with particular ex-
periential features (see above), not their possible overt
behavioral manifestations. However, this does not render
our diagnostic access to patients’ obsessions inferen-
tially direct. In other words, this is a difference in the se-
mantics, not the epistemology of our psychopathological
concepts and hypotheses formulated with their help.
Here lies the second source of Jaspers’ ambiguity on the
epistemological status of empathy: Jaspers conflated
the semantic category of what basic psychopathological
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mental symptoms (their reference) with the epistemological
category of our mode of access to their referents. At times
also, he seems to conflate these semantic and epistemo-
logical categories with the psychological category of clini-
cians’subjective certainty ([1], p. 315, [2], p. 2).
Although focused on Jaspers’ classic essay, my analysis
of the epistemological status of psychopathological diag-
nostic examination and the role of empathy therein ex-
ceeds by far the exegesis of Jaspers’ classic essay and
is highly relevant to contemporary psychopathological
approaches aiming to overcome the serious limitations
of currently prevailing systems of diagnostic criteria of
mental disorders. More precisely, one such innovative
post-Jaspersian phenomenological approach in psycho-
pathology contests the very distinction between patients’
inner abnormal mental experiences and their outer man-
ifestations, stressing the expressive nature of all mental
symptoms (see e.g. [21]). This approach stems from a
rich philosophical phenomenological tradition including
the work of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heiddegger, Maurice
Merleau-Ponty, Max Scheler, Edith Stein, and Alfred
Schutz, further developed and defended by contem-
porary philosophers, notably by Shaun Gallagher and
Dan Zahavi (see e.g. [5]). According to this approach,
mental states are directly expressed in one’s expressive
behavior and thus, our understanding of others is infer-
entially direct. This approach to social cognition rejects
the ‘third-person’ observational stance towards others
and favors instead a ‘second person’ interactive stance
whereby mental states are expressed in embodied and
contextualized behaviors. I cannot deal here with this im-
portant approach to social cognition and inter-subjective
understanding which challenges both mainstream ap-
proaches to our ability to ascribe and understand the
mental states of our fellow humans (“theory of mind”),
namely the “theory-theory” and the “simulation theory”
(see e.g. [22]). However, all these theories bear on the de-
velopment and the underpinnings of our generic human
capacity to understand others. By contrast, as I tried to
show, psychopathological diagnostic examination in the
context of the clinical interview is not merely a social hu-
man interaction but, in addition, a specialist endeavor
with the aid of concepts afforded by general and clinical
psychopathology and a specific aim, namely a maximally
accurate and comprehensive psychopathological diagno-
sis. Moreover, this endeavor requires the mastering of
psychopathological concepts, the thorough investigation
of patients’ abnormal mental experiences with the aid of
indicator-hypotheses linking these experiences to their
verbal and non-verbal manifestations, as well as the satis-
faction of a whole set of further conditions (see condi-
tions C1-C5 above). As such, it involves not only the
generic ‘second person’ stance of a simple interactive
social encounter, but also a ‘third person’ observational
stance. It goes without saying that it requires also clini-
cians’ ability to adopt both stances and switch flexibly
from the one to the other during the diagnostic interview.
It is in this specific context that I find problematic one of
the main tenets of the phenomenological approach,
namely the thesis of an invariant relation of expressivity
between one’s mental experiences and behavioral manifes-
tations since it implies that patients’ psychological states
and experiences are directly observable and understood.
As a result, this approach sees no need for any distinction
between direct and indirect psychopathological observa-
tion and thus incurs the risk of construing again all psy-
chopathological observation as direct observation “with an
inner eye”. Moreover, since this approach admits the real-
ity of patients’ mental experiences, it incurs also the risk
of conflating the semantics with the epistemology of diag-
nostic psychopathological concepts and hypotheses. If, as I
tried to show at some length, most proper mental symp-
toms lack distinctive behavioral manifestations, this ap-
proach cannot be fully adequate, at least in the field of
psychopathological diagnostic examination. Besides, the
‘direct perception’ thesis about our mode of understanding
others has also been challenged in the philosophy of mind.
In particular, it has been pointed out that it cannot
account for the under-determination of mental states
by behavioral evidence: the same behavioral evidence is
compatible with different underlying mental states. Thus,
behavioral evidence is insufficient to ascertain and iden-
tify others’ beliefs and intentions (see e.g. [23,24]. Overall
then, the phenomenological ‘second person’ approach,
though a necessary ingredient of the psychopathological
diagnostic examination is clearly insufficient and needs
to be supplemented by a ‘third person’ approach along
the lines of my epistemological analysis.
Conclusions
I have examined Jaspers’ account of the epistemological
role of empathy in the context of the clinical diagnostic
examination pointing out the ambiguity of his main
claims. Then, I have tried to elucidate the epistemo-
logical status of psychopathological diagnostic examin-
ation with the aid of the standard in contemporary
philosophy of science distinction between direct and in-
direct observation. This elucidation was a prerequisite
for the investigation of the exact epistemological role of
empathy within the context of psychopathological diag-
nostic examination. My main result was that clinical
diagnostic examination of properly mental symptoms
(Jaspers’“ subjective” symptoms) is mainly indirect psy-
chopathological observation. I have then traced Jaspers’
ambiguity to his failure to distinguish clearly between
direct and indirect psychopathological observation as
well as between the semantics and the epistemology of
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issues helps remove Jaspers’ ambiguity and restore the
coherence of his account. Thus, Jaspers was right in
claiming that psychopathological concepts of mental
symptoms represent directly real abnormal experiences
and thus, are semantically irreducible to concepts repre-
senting their actual or possible behavioral manifesta-
tions. However, he failed to recognize clearly that our
epistemological access to these experiences in the con-
text of psychopathological diagnostic examination is
mainly indirect. My analysis of the epistemological status
of psychopathological diagnostic examination and the
role of empathy therein is also highly relevant to recent
innovative phenomenological approaches aiming to over-
come the serious limitations of currently prevailing systems
of criteria for the diagnosis of mental disorders.
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